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Abstract: During the last two and half decades Turkey has suffered from three foreign 
exchange crisis resulting in considerable loss of income.  The paper argues that the 
country in order to avoid the foreign exchange crisis has to stay away from having too big 
current account deficits. Noting that under perfect capital mobility there will always be 
the unavoidable risk of speculative attacks on the currency unless the country resolves its 
fiscal problems, attains price stability, and achieves a sound banking sector, the paper 
stresses importance of current account sustainability and  highlights shortcomings of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last two and half decades Turkey has experienced three  balance of 
payments  crises.
1  These  crises  highlighted the danger of having too big current 
account deficits which are associated with a high probability of a balance of payments 
crisis. A natural question that arises is when these deficits are sustainable.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the sustainability of current account deficits in 
Turkey.  The paper is structured as follows. While section 2  considers the 
characteristics of the Turkish foreign exchange regime during the last two decades, 
section 3 concentrates on the study of developments in real exchange rate (RER). 
Section 4 analyzes the relation between current account and the real exchange rate, 
and  section  5 discusses issues related with current account sustainability and 
determination of the equilibrium RER.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIME 
 
Until the end of the 1970s, Turkey followed fixed and multiple exchange rate policy 
while  experiencing  relatively  high inflation rates. The policy  led to loss of 
competitiveness and eventually to the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970’s. GNP 
shrank by  0.5 percent in 1979 and by  2.8 percent in 1980. With the stabilization 
measures of 1980, Turkey devalued the Turkish Lira by 33 percent, and eliminated the 
multiple exchange rate system except for imports of fertilizers and fertilizer inputs. 
After May 1981 the exchange rate was adjusted daily against major currencies in order 
to maintain the competitiveness of Turkish exports. Multiple currency practices were 
phased out and bilateral payments agreements with non-Fund members were 
terminated during the first couple of years of the 1980 stabilization program. The 
government pursued a policy of RER depreciation, depreciating the RER annually on 
average by about 6 percent over the period 1980-1988.  
 
In January 1984 domestic commercial banks were allowed to engage in foreign 
exchange operations within certain limits, and restrictions on foreign travel and 
investment from abroad were eased and simplified. The determination of the exchange 
rate was further liberalized by permitting banks to set their own rates within a 
specified b and around the Central Bank rate. In August 1988 major reform was 
introduced and a system of market setting of foreign exchange rates was adopted. In 
1989 foreign exchange operations and international capital movements were 
liberalized entirely.
2 In line with full convertibility of the Turkish Lira, banks were left 
free in determining exchange rates in their operations in 1990. 
                                                            
1 These are the crises of late 1970’s, 1994 and 2001. 
2 Turkey opened the capital account in 1989 before it had taken measures to upgrade banking and financial 
market supervision a nd regulation, adopt international auditing and accounting standards, strengthen 
corporate governance and shareholder rights, and modernize bankruptcy and insolvency procedures.  The 
1994 and 2001 crises occured when the country was facing large fiscal deficits, public debts and high 
inflation rates. There were problems of competitiveness leading to substantial current account deficits. In   3
 
A drawback of the RER depreciation policy pursued during the 1980’s was the decline 
in real wages measured in terms of foreign currency. By the second half of the 1980's 
the popular support for the government started to fall off. In the local elections of 
March 1989 the governing political party suffered heavy losses. To increase political 
support the government conceded substantial  pay increases during collective 
bargaining in the public sector. Consequently, pressure built up in the private sector to 
arrive at similarly high wage settlements. As a result of these developments the real 
wages started to increase and RER started to appreciate.  
 
According to the government the appreciation of the RER that occured after 1989 was 
due to market forces. But during this period large capital inflows into Turkey occured 
as the country was offering besides high real interest rates the prospect of steady real 
appreciation. During the 1990’s the public finances had deteriorated considerably. The 
large public sector deficits could be financed by borrowing from the market at very 
high real interest rates.
3 The government's implicit commitment to RER appreciation 
insured the private sector, domestic and foreign, against currency risk. It encouraged 
capital inflows from abroad and it encouraged lending to the public sector, giving rise 
to the phenomenon of large arbitrage-related short-term capital inflows. 
 
The policy pursued during the first half of the 1990’s was not sustainable. In 1993 the 
current account deficit to GNP ratio had reached 3.5 percent. In 1994 the country 
faced balance of payments crises as a result of which GNP shrank by 6.1 percent. 
With the introduction of stabilization measures the trend in RER was reversed. RER 
depreciated by 64 percent during January 1994 and April 1994. But because of the 
relatively weak coalition governments, the country had to reverse its economic 
policies. RER started to appreciate again after April 1994 and appreciated by about 
                                                                                                                                                                      
addition the currency and maturity mismatches on the balance sheets of the banks had left the authorities 
little leeway for using either interest-rate or exchange rate adjustments to restore balance without 
undermining the stability of the banking sector. Finally, there was excessive dependence on short-term 
foreign borrowing to finance the current account deficits. These weaknesses contributed sunbstantially to 
the balance of payments crisis of 1994 and 2001. 

















































 where it denotes the annual rate of interest 
on government bonds attained as the weighted average rate in auctions during the month t weighted by total 
sales during the month, and pt the expected annual rate of inflation at time t over the period t to t+12. In the 
calculations of the real interest rate we set the expected annual rate of inflation at time t over the period t to 
t+12 equal to the actual annual rate of inflation over the period t to t+12 for the period 1991.01 to 2002.10. 
For the period 2002.11 to 2003.10 we set the expected annual rate of inflation equal to the expected 
inflation rate as determined from the survey conducted by the Central Bank of Turkey. Here we note that 
the real interest rate in general has been very high during most of the 1994-2003 period. Real interest rate 
turned out to be negative in the pre-crisis periods of 1994 and 2001,  since the rise in inflation rate 
experienced after the crisis was not expected at pre-crisis periods. The average level of real interest rates 
over the period 1994.01 to 2003.10 was 25.5 percent.   4
23.5 percent during April 1994 and September 1995.   
 
Between 1995 and 1997 the economy went through a boom period of above trend 
growth. But, in 1998 the economy was badly hit by the Russian crisis. In August 1999 
the Marmara area of Turkey was hit by a severe earthquake and this was followed by a 
further large shock in the Bolu area in November, 1999. As a result of these shocks 
real GNP shrank by 6.1 percent in 1999. At the end of 1999 Turkey embarked upon an 
ambitious stabilization program. Central to the program has been the policy of using a 
pre-determined exchange rate path as a nominal anchor for reducing inflationary 
expectations. During the course of 2000 the RER appreciated c onsiderably which 
aggravated  further  the current account deficits leading to concerns about the 
sustainability of the exchange rate regime. The current account deficit to GNP ratio 
reached  4.9 percent in 2000.  This episode ended with a severe  currency  crisis in 
February 2001. There was a serious run on the Turkish Lira, interest rates sky rocketed 
and foreign exchange reserves started to decline rapidly. The government decided to 
abandon the crawling peg regime. The currency was floated. As a result, the exchange 
rate depreciated sharply.  On May 15, 2001 the IMF increased its assistance under a 
new stand-by arrangement. This program aimed to strengthen the balance of public 
finances in a way that would prevent deterioration in the future. During the course of 
2001 Turkey introduced a set of structural reforms. But the September 11 tragedy 
caused a threat to the reform progress. Turkey responded with a strengthened medium 
term program aimed at cleaning up the banking sector, consolidating fiscal adjustment 
and achieving disinflation. In February 2002 the IMF approved a three year stand-by 
credit for Turkey to support the government's economic program. The severity of the 
2001 crisis has surprised nearly all observers. GNP during 2001 has contracted by 9.4 
percent and the loss in employment is put at more than 1 million.
4 Towards the end of 
2001 RER started to appreciate again and the appreciation of the RER is continuing as 
of February 2004. With the appreciation of the RER considerable economic recovery 
was observed in 2002 and 2003.  
 
Figure  1 shows the developments in current account deficit to G DP ratio on a 
quarterly basis starting with first quarter of 1987.
5,6 Noting that the years of currency 
crisis were 1994 and 2001 t he table reveals that the probabilility of a balance of 
payments crisis increases in Turkey as current account to GDP ratio increases above 
the critical level of 3.5 percent.
7 
                                                            
4 The reason for the severity of the 2001 crisis compared to previous foreign exchange crisis is explained by 
the fact that by  2001 Turkey had a high level of ‘liability dollarization’, with high public and private 
foreign debt which was denominated in foreign currencies, and also a high share of foreign currency 
denominated bank deposits. As a result, the sharp depreciation caused a large increase in both the gross and 
the net indebtedness of the economy, which more than offset the positive effect of depreciation on the 
demand for exports.  
5 Monthly series on current account, interest payments and interest receipts exists since December 1984. 
But quarterly national income series are available since 1987. Figure 1 shows the three period moving 
average of current account deficit to GDP ratio.  
6 The figure shows the three period moving averages of current account to GDP ratio. 
7 Besides the size of current account deficits the quality of the sources of financing the deficit matters a lot. 
A high percentage of short term debt increases the probability of sudden capital outflows leading to a crisis.   5
 
{Insert Figure 1} 
 
To formally study the evolution of the foreign exchange rate regime over the last two 
decades  in Turkey  we  turn to  the  IMF publication “Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions”.  IMF in those reports  classified the 
exchange rate policies based on information provided by the member countries. Until 
1998 members’ regimes were grouped into three categories: (i) pegged regimes, (ii) 
regimes with limited flexibility, and (iii) more flexible arrangements, where regimes 
with limited flexibility referred to those cases that permit the exchange rate to 
fluctuate within a range or within a cooperative arrangement. In this classification the 
exchange rate arrangement (i) refers to fixed, (ii) to intermediate and (iii) to flexible 
regimes. However, the classification had two major shortcomings. First, it failed to 
capture differences between what the countries claimed to be doing and what they 
were doing in reality. Second, by lumping rigid forms of pegs together with softer 
pegs it failed to acknowledge the different degree of monetary authonomy afforded by 
each regime. To address these shortcomings IMF adopted in 1999 a new classification 
scheme based on still de facto policies. The new scheme allows for eight different 
categories ranging  from the adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender to free 
floats. The eight regimes are: (I) dollarization and euroization, (II) currency board, 
(III) conventional fixed pegs, (IV) horizontal bands, (IV) crawling pegs, (VI) crawling 
bands, (VII) managed float with no preannounced path for the exchange rate, and 
(VIII) independent float.
8 This classification treats exchange arrangements I, II, and III 
as fixed regimes, IV, V, and VI as intermediate regimes, and VII and VIII as flexible 
regimes. Finally, Babula and Otker-Robe (2002) distinguish between 13 regimes. 
These regimes are: (1) formal dollarization and euroization, (2) currency union, (3) 
currency board arrangements, (4) conventional fixed pegs vis-a-vis single currency, 
(5) conventioanl fixed pegs vis-a-vis a basket of currencies, (6) horizontal bands, (7) 
forward  looking crawling pegs, (8) backward looking crawling pegs, (9) forward  
looking crawling bands, (10) backward looking crawling bands,  (11) tightly managed 
floats, (12) other managed floats with no predetermined exchange rate path, and (13) 
independently floating.
9 The classification of Babula and Otker-Robe treats exchange 
                                                                                                                                                                      
It is recognized that foreign direct investment (FDI) is by far the surest form of external financing. But FDI 
flows into Turkey have been rather low. Thus, external sustainability is an important issue for Turkey. 
8 Under “conventional fixed pegs” the currency is pegged to another currency or currency basket within a 
band of at most +/- 1 percent. While “horizontal bands” refer to pegs with bands larger than +/- 1 percent, 
“crawling pegs” refer to pegs with central parity periodically adjusted in fixed amounts at a pre-announced 
rate or in response to changes in selected quantitative indicators. “Crawling bands” refer to crawling pegs 
combined with bands larger than +/- 1 percent. While “managed float with no preannounced path for the 
exchange rate” refer to a regime with active interventions without precommitment to a preannounced target 
or path for the exchange rate, the “independent float” regime refers to market determined exchange rate 
with monetary policy independent of exchange rate policy. 
9 The crawl is viewed as “backward looking” when the crawl aim to passively accomodate e.g. past inflation 
differentials under a real exchange rate rule, and as “forward looking” when the exchange rate is adjusted at 
a preannounced fixed rate and/or  set below projected inflation differentials, typically when the exchange 
rate is envisaged to have an ancor role. Under “tightly managed floats” interventions take the form of very 
tight monitoring that generally results in stable exchange rate without having a clear exchange rate path, so   6
arrangements 1, 2, and 3 as hard peg regimes, 4-11 as intermediate regimes, and 12 
and 13 as floating regimes.  
 
Table 1 reports in column 1 the exchange regime according to IMF classification prior 
to 1999, in column 2 the exchange regime according to the IMF classification after 
1999, and in column 3 the exchange regime according to the classification of Babula 
and Otker-Robe.  Although the first two columns do not reveal much about the 
exchange rate regime of Turkey followed during the 1980’s, the column 3 shows that 
Turkey  under high capital mobility  has  abondened the  intermediate  regimes of 
“forward looking crawling bands” and “forward looking crawling pegs” and moved 
towards a regime of free floats. But even the classification of Babula and Otker-Robe 
does not reveal the essentials of the exchange regime followed by Turkey. We 
therefore turn  to consideration of the basics of the de facto exchange rate regime 
followed by Turkey during the last two decades.  Following Zhou (2002)  we 
concentrate on three measures: (i) “volatility of exchange rates” defined as the average 
of absolute monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate during a year, 
(ii) “volatility of exchange rate changes” defined as the standard  deviation of the 
monthly percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate during a year, and (iii) 
“volatility of reserves”  defined as the average of absolute monthly changes in the 
non-gold reserves, normalized by the reserve money in the previous month. We expect 
fixed regimes to have low values for “volatility of exchange rates”, low values for 
“volatility of exchange rate changes” and high values for “volatility of reserves”. On 
the other hand flexible regimes should combine high values for “volatility of exchange 
rates” and “volatility of exchange rate changes” with low values for “volatility of 
reserves”.  
 
{Insert Table 1} 
 
The  estimated  values of  volatility of exchange rates, volatility of exchange rate 
changes and volatility of reserves for Turkey reported in columns 4-6 in Table 1 for 
1980-2003 reveal that the volatility of exchange rates and volatility of exchange rate 
changes during 1981-1990 and during 2000 have been rather low. During the period 
1980-1988 when Turkey tried to achieve annual RER devaluation of about 6 percent, 
the volatility of reserves has been rather low. On the other hand during 2000 when 
Turkey followed a semi currency board arrangement the volatility of reserves has been 
relatively high.  
 
The volatility of reserves started to increase after the liberalization of international 
capital movements  in 1989. As  the exchange rate became more and more  market 
determined the  volatility of exchange rates and volatility of reserves increased 
considerably during the periods 1991-1993 and also during 1995-2001. During the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as to permit the authorities an extra degree of flexibility in deciding the tactics to achieve a desired path. 
Under “other managed floats with no predetermined exchange rate path” exchange rate is influenced in a 
more ad hoc fashion. 
   7
crises periods of 1994 and 2001  the  values of all the three measures increased 
enormously. During the period 2002-2003 the country has experienced relatively high 
values of volatility of exchange rates and volatility of reserves.  
 
The above considerations reveal  the difficulties in classifying the exchange rate 
regimes as fixed, intermediate and flexible regimes. The data show that policy makers 
have tried to use the exchange rate as a policy variable during the two periods of 
1980-1988 and 2000. But during 1989-1999 and 2001-2003 the exchange rate was 
largely endogeneously determined  together  with  the  other variables in the system. 
During 1980-2003 as a whole Turkey has used mainly intermediate exchange rate 
regimes with considerable interventions in the exchange markets rather than the fixed 
or the flexible exchange rate regimes. 
 
3. DEVELOPMENTS IN REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
In order to study the developments in RER one has to decide first on the appropriate 
methodology for  contruction of  the  RER indices. Here  one is faced with four 
decisions: choice of the price index, choice of the currency basket, choice of weights 
and choice of mathematical formula. In the formulation of the RER we use CPI as 
these data are available on a monthly basis for a large number of countries. Regarding 
the currency basket we consider countries which are major competitors of Turkey in 
world markets as well as major suppliers of imported commodities to Turkey. The 
countries considered consist of  
 
•  Western Europe: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland and UK 
•  America: Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the US 
•  Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Iran, Syria, Tunisia 
•  Central and Eastern European and Commonwealth of Independent States 
Countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia 
•  Asia: China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand. 
 
For determining the weights of different countries we use the approach developed by 
Zanello and Desruelle (1997). According to their approach overall trade weights are 
derived by combining the bilateral import weights with the double export weights, 
using the relative size of Turkish imports and exports in overall Turkish trade to 
average both sets of weights. One can put these in formal terms as  
 
Import weight:    ) / ( M M w i
m
i =  
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where Mi denotes imports of  Turkey from country i, M total value of Turkish imports, 
Xi Turkish exports to country i, X total value of Turkish exports, yi value of domestic 
manufacturing production for home market of country i, and X
k
i exports of country k 














, where Ï stands for the product sign, i is the index that runs 
over the country’s trade partners, Ei is the exchange rate defined as domestic currency 
per unit of US Dollar of country i, E is the TL/$ exchange rate and w  i  the 
competitiveness weight attached by Turkey to country i calculated using the method of 
Zanello and Desruelle (1997).  
 
Figure 2 shows the time path of the RER over the last two decades. The figure reveals 
that there are four episodes. After the foreign exchange crisis of late 1970’s the RER 
started to  depreciate sharply  with the stabilization measures of 1980. It kept 
depreciating until 1988 and then it started to appreciate. Appreciation of the RER 
carried on until 1994 when the country was faced with another currency crisis. In 1994 
RER depreciated sharply. But after a while RER started to appreciate again and 
appreciation of the RER carried on from  April  1994 to February 2001 when the 
country was faced with the currency crisis of 2001. After the sharp depreciation of the 
RER during February 2001 to April 2001 it started to appreciate and in particular after 
after November 2001. The RER is still appreciating as of February 2004. 
 
{Insert Figure 2} 
 
To emphasize the extent of annual inflation and rate of depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate we show in Figure 3 the time path of annual CPI inflation and the 
annual rate of depreciation of the exchange rate on a monthly basis. The figure reveals 
that the annual rate of depreciation of the exchange rate has exceeded substantially the 
annual rate of domestic inflation during the the periods of February 1980 - December 
1984, January 1994 – February 1995 and February 2001 – March 2002.  On the other 
hand the rate of inflation has exceeded substantially the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate during the periods of July 1989 – May 1991, March 1995 – March 
1996, November 1997 – April 1999 and March 2002 to March 2004. 
 
{Insert Figure 3} 
 
4. CURRENT ACCOUNT AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
We consider the  non-interest current account (NICA) measured i n million of US 
Dollars, where NICA is defined as current account plus interest payments on foreign   9
debt minus interest receipts.
10  Using  quarterly data for 1988:I to 2003:II we 
concentrate on the NICA/GDP ratio and note that one of the main determinants of this 
ratio is the RER. A second factor that strongly affects the NICA/GDP ratio is the 
aggregate demand for domestic goods and services consisting of total consumption 
plus investment demand in the home country as well as the rest of the world. As 
aggregate domestic demand for goods and services in the home country increases it 
triggers imports and, ceteris paribus NICA/GDP ratio is expected to decline. 
Similarly, as aggregate domestic demand for goods and services increases in the rest 
of the world it triggers imports of the foreign country and, ceteris paribus, NICA/GDP 
ratio in the home country is expected to increase. 
 
In order to explain the developments in NICA, the following equation is estimated 
 
(NICA/GDP) =b0+ b1 dlog(ADD) + b2 dlog(ADDF) + b3 RER + â4 DQ3 + â5 D1999 + 
â6 D93ST +  â7 D2000 
 
where  dlog(ADD) denotes the annual growth rate of real aggregate domestic demand 
in the home country, dlog(ADDF) the annual growth rate of real aggregate domestic 
demand in the rest of the world, RER the real exchange rate,  DQ3 the third quarter 
seasonal dummy, D1999 the recession and earthquake dummy for the year 1999 
taking the value of 1 for quarters II to IV of 1999 and 0 otherwise, D93ST the 
structural break dummy in 1993 taking the value of 1 after 1993 and 0 otherwise, and 
D2000 taking the value of 1 for all quarters of 2000 and 0 otherwise. The D93ST 
dummy refers to the structural break in Turkey’s balance of payments that took place 
after the liberalization of the capital account in 1990. Since economic agents respond 
with lag to such decisions, a series of tests were conducted to identify the structural 
break due to this decision. Finally, the D2000 dummy refers to the exchange rate 
based stabilization measures. All of the variables used in the estimation are checked 
for unit roots, and it has been found that the series are all stationary.
11 Because of the 
simultaneity problems faced in the model we use instrumental techniques to estimate 
the parameters. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 2. Diagnostic tests 
on residuals are given in the table. Since the DW test statistics falls in between the 
inconclusive area, we can conclude that there is no evidence of serial correlation in the 
residuals.  
 
{Insert Table 2} 
 
The coefficients of the variables are  all  statistically significant and all have the 
expected signs. An increase in the growth rate of aggregate domestic demand in the 
home country reduces the NICA/GDP ratio while an increase in the growth rate of 
                                                            
 
10 Monthly series on current account, interest payments and interest receipts exists since December 1984. 
But quarterly national income series are available since 1987. 
11 In order  to deal with the simultaneity problem in a simple way four quarter lagged value of RER is used  
as instrumental variable.     10
aggregate domestic demand in the rest of the world increases the NICA/GDP ratio. 
The NICA/GDP  ratio increases  as the RER depreciates. The coefficient of the 
structural change dummy is negative, which indicates that liberalization of the capital 
account had a negative impact on NICA/GDP ratio, which is expected. 
 
5.  CURRENT ACCOUNT  SUSTAINABILITY  AND THE 
EQUILIBRIUM REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
The basic presumption of our approach is that the current account must be sustainable. 
If not, then the country is expected to face an exchange rate collapse or an external 
debt default which in turn will imply a reduction in real income and employment, 
deviating from the long run growth path. Starting from the notion that under current 
account sustainability the country must satisfy its lifetime budget constraint, we say 
that the current stance of policies are sustainable if the continuation of the current 
government policy stance and private sector behavior into the future does not entail a 
drastic policy shift or lead to a currency or or balance of payments crisis 
 
To emphasize the points stressed above consider the balance of payments relation 
which can be written as  
 
0 * 1 1
$ = D - - + + - - - t t t t t t R D D FDI D i TB  
 
where TB
$ denotes non-interest current account, D stock of foreign debt, i* the 
foreign rate of interest, FDI net foreign direct investment, R foreign exchange reserves 
of the country,  t t t Account Current D i TB = - - ) * ( 1
$ , 
t t t t Account Capital D D FDI = - + - ) ( 1 , and  t R D  the change in reserves. All variables 
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= D  the change in 
reserves to GDP ratio, the equation determining the time path of dt can be written as 
 
t t t t t r fdi d
g
r
tb d D + -
+
+ +
+ - = -1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( *) 1 ( h
 
  
where r* denotes foreign real rate of interest and h the rate of depreciation of the 
RER. The equation shows that external debt to GDP ratio decreases with increases in 
non-interest current account to GDP ratio tb, foreign direct investment to GDP ratio 
fdi, and growth rate of GDP g. On the other hand the debt to GDP ratio increases with   11
increases in foreign real interest rate r*, rate of depreciation of the RER h and changes 
in reserves to GDP ratio r D .  
 
Following the approach of von Hagen and Harden (1994) we solve this expression 
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Here,  k t, d  can be interpreted as the k-periods ahead discount factor used to calculate 
the present value of assets and liabilities in period t+k for period t.  k t t x E +  denotes the 
period t expectation of the variable x in period t+k. The equation shows that current 
debt to GDP ratio equals  the expected discounted present value of foreign debt 
outstanding in period t+n relative to GDP plus the sum of all discounted At’s between 
period t and period t+n. Theoretically, the intertemporal budget constraint requires 
that  0 lim , £ +n t n t t d E d as n becomes very large, so that foreign debt remains bounded 
relative to GDP. If the intertemporal budget constraint was violated, the price of the 
debt of the country would fall to zero and the country would see itself barred from 
international capital markets.   
 
To translate the intertemporal budget constraint  into a practically more relevant 
requirement we consider the above relation for a limited period of time  n*. We 
consider the period 1984-2003 and use actual data on d t, tbt and fdit for any year 
during the time interval 1984-2003. For each year t of the time period 1984-2003 we 
estimate the expected discounted present value at time t of foreign debt outstanding in 
period t+n* relative to GDP plus the sum of all discounted At’s between period t and 
period t+n*.  Regarding the government policy stance and the private sector behavior 
over the period t to t+n* we assume that the values of tbt+i and fdit+i for i = 1 .. n* will 
remain unchanged at their initial values tbt and fdit  .  Thus, w e assume that the 
government, private sector and rest of the world will not change their policies they 
pursue in period t over the time period t+1 and t+n*. Furthermore, we assume that at 
the end of the period t+n* the debt to GDP ratio will return to its initial value at time t, 
i.e. dt+n* = dt.  
 
Consideration of the Turkish annual growth rate of GDP over the period 1980-2003 
reveals that the average growth rate of GDP has amounted to 4.1 percent during 1980-  12
1989, and to 3.7 percent during 1990-2003. Hence, for the growth rate of GDP over 
the time period t to t+n*  we take the figure of 4 percent. On the other hand  we 
consider the  foreign real interest rate to equal 8 percent over the time period t to 
t+n*.
12  Finally, we assume in the following calculations that   0 = Dr for each year of 
the period t to t+n* and that over the same time period  h equals zero.  
 








+ + + = d d l  
is at least as large as unity. Here dt denotes the actual debt to GDP ratio in period t and 
At+i = (tbt + fdit) for i = 1 .. t+n*. The result of calculations for n* = 10, n* = 20 and 
n* = 25 are shown in Table 3. 
 
{Insert Table 3}. 
 
The table reveals that during 1984 current account was unsustainable in the sense that 
the actual debt to GDP ratio in 1984 exceeded the expected discounted present value 
of foreign debt outstanding in period  2009 relative to GDP plus the sum of all 
discounted A t’s between period 1984 and period  2009. This indicates that current 
account needed adjustment in NICA/GDP and FDI/GDP ratio. During the following 
years Turkey has increased the NICA/GDP ratio considerably, but there was not much 
change in FDI/GDP. The table indicates that the policy has been successful and that 
country reached closer to sustainability in 1987. The ratio exceeded unity during 1988 
and 1989.  The warning signals for the 1994 currency  crisis can be seen from the 
negative figures of the ratio for 1993. The situation improved after the crisis when l 
increased above unity in 1994, b ut after  1994  the current account was again 
unsustainable. The value of l for the year 2000, the year before the currency crisis of 
2001, was again negative. Although the sustainability of the current account improved 
in 2001, the system was not sustainable again in 2002 and 2003. .  
 
Consideration of the value of l for 2003 reveals that the ratio equals 11 percent when 
n* = 25. Thus, the actual debt to GDP ratio in 2003 equals only 11 percent of the sum 
of the expected discounted present value of foreign debt outstanding in period 2028 
relative to GDP and the sum of all discounted At’s between period 2003 and period 
2028. The system is not sustainable. The sustainability of the current account requires 
that the value of l be increased to unity. This can only be achieved through either an 
increase in NICA/GDP ratio tbt or through an increase in FDI/GDP ratio fdit during 
the period 2004 to 2028 or through a combination of increases in both NICA/GDP and 
FDI/GDP ratios during the same time period. 
 
In 2003 the actual value of At = (tbt + fdit) equaled -1.075 percent. On the other hand 
the value of A t for t during the period from 2004 to 2028 that will make Turkey 
                                                            
12 See e.g. (OECD, 2002).   13
achieve external sustainability with l = 1 is 2.354 percent.
13 Thus, Turkey has to 
increase the sum of its non-interest current account/GDP and FDI/GDP ratio over the 
period 2004 to 2028 by 3.429 percent. Suppose that fdit during the time period 2004 to 
2028 stays constant at its 2003 level of 0.029 percent.
14 Then the increase in tbt  and 
hence in At during the period 2004 to 2028 can be achieved by depreciating the RER 
and keeping the RER at its “long run equilibrium level” over time.
15 To determine the 
extent of depreciation in RER we consider the regression equation reported in Table 2. 
From that table it follows that the RER has to increase from its level attained in 
September 2003 by about 114 percent and kept around that level over time. 
 
Consider now the issue of increasing the FDI/GDP ratio. Here we note a striking 
feature of foreign direct investment flows to Turkey. The level is too low relative to 
FDI flows to developing countries with similar levels of GDP per capita. In particular, 
the FDI flows to Central and Eastern European countries are much larger than those to 
Turkey.  However, i n terms of population, Turkey is larger than Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary combined.  In terms of GDP, Turkey’s economy is four times 
as large as that of Czech Republic or Hungary, and one quarter larger than Poland in 
                                                            
13 The above considerations were based on the idea that under external sustainability the actual debt to GDP 
ratio dt in period t be equal to the sum of expected discounted present value of foreign debt outstanding in 
period t+n* relative to GDP and the sum of all discounted A t’s between period t+1 and period t+n*. 
Alternatively, one can narrow the condition for sustainability to the requirement that the ratio of net stock of 
foreign liabilities to GDP stays constant over time at its initial value. In that case the equation determining 
the time path of debt to GDP ratio d  can be solved for the equilibrium value of the sum of tb and fdi under 
the assumption that  0 = Dr  as: 
 













) * * ( h h
. 
 
Assuming that h equals zero and setting the value of g = 0.04 , r* = 0.08 and d = 0.612 of the year 2003 the 
equilibrium value of (tb + fdi) is determined as 2.354 percent. The figure is in fact not different from the 
figure we found earlier. Thus for n* = 25 the two appraoches yield the same solution. 
14 During 2003 inward and outward FDI flows amounted to 0.239 and 0.21 percent of GDP respectively. 
Thus the net FDI inflow was only 0.029 percent of GDP. 
15 
15 In the literature there are basically two approaches to the determination of the long run equilibrium 
value of the RER. According to Williamson (1994) and Wren-Lewis and Driver (2000) the fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) is the real exchange rate that would exist when the economy is at full 
employment (internal balance) and in current account equilibrium (external balance). Thus, FEER is the 
RER which will bring the current account into equality with the “sustainable” capital account, where home 
and foreign aggregate outputs are set at their full employment values. On the other hand,  Clark and 
MacDonald’s (1998) model of behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) analyzes the actual behavior 
of  RER with econometric techniques, where the reduced form equation is estimated with assumed longer 
term fundamentals and short term variables using cointegration analysis. MacDonald and Stein (1999) and 
Hinkle and Montiel (1999) consider as fundamental variables productivity and net foreign assets. Other 
variables identified in the literature include real interest differentials, measures of openness of trade and 
exchange system and size of fiscal balance. Finally, we note that Stein and Allen (1995) distinguish between 
medium and long-term factors influencing the RER.The approach developed in this paper can be considered 
as an extension of the FEER approach. Instead of imposing the equality of the current account with the 
sustainable capital account, we require that the NICA/GDP ratio be sustainable.   14
2000, and in terms of gross fixed capital formation Turkey’s investments during 2000 
are 3 to 4 times larger than Czech Republic and Hungary, and roughly a sixth larger 
than Poland.  In terms of average annual inflows of FDI during the 1990s, the level of 
FDI inflows that Turkey has been attracting, at USD 800 million, is roughly one-fifth 
of FDI inflows to Poland, at 4.1 billion, and also significantly lower than Czech 
Republic and Hungary, each attracting roughly 2.1 billion per annum. 
 
To explain the factors determining the FDI flows we  first  define  the i nvestment 
climate in the country as the policy, institutional and behavioural environment, present 
and expected, that influences the perceived returns and risks associated with 
investment in terms of both quantity and productivity of investment flows. Investment 
climate thus defined depends on a wide array of factors that can be grouped under the 
headings of (i)  macroeconomic and trade policies,  (ii)  infrastructure, and  (iii) 
governance and institutions. Although Turkey has an open trade regime it was unable 
to attract large FDI inflows. One of the main culprits behind this failure was the 
uncertain macroeconomic environment.  As a result of the uncertainties stemming 
from domestic politics, the macroeconomic environment and the ensuing high real 
interest rates, the country followed a very erratic growth performance.  Turkey 
throughout the last two decades, had put many decisions that could help foreign 
investors cope with high inflation on hold. One of the critical measures that Turkey 
did not introduce has been the inflation accounting framework in the context of high 
inflationary environment.  Besides the macroeconomic aspects there are  also 
infrastructure related factors. Although the quantity and quality of Turkey’s broadly-
defined infrastructure, including geographical and demographical endowments, and 
physical and financial infrastructure help position Turkey as a potentially powerful 
magnet for FDI inflows, these factors also did not help Turkey to attract increased 
amounts of FDI flows. The main bottlenecks as emphasized by Dutz et al. (2003) 
seem to be insufficient respect for the rule of law  and weak competition in local 
markets, reinforced by uneven application of bureaucratic red-tape. Turkey, in order to 
attrack higher levels of FDI flows in the future, has to improve not only its 
macroeconomic environment but also increase the respect for the rule of law, increase 
competition in local markets, and reduce the bureaucratic red-tape. 
 
Once Turkey will be able to attract higher levels of FDI into the country it does not 
need to depreciate its currency by as much as  114 percent in order to attain 
sustainability in its current account. Table 4 shows the required rates of depreciation 
of the RER for different values of the FDI/GDP ratios. With increases in FDI/GDP 
ratios the required rate of depreciation of the RER in order to attain sustainability in 
the current account decreases. When the FDI/GDP ratio increases to 3.5 percent of 
GDP then the system becomes sustainable and there is no need to depreciate the RER 
over time. But this will require that FDI/GDP ratio be kept at 3.5 percent of GDP over 
time. 
 
{Insert Table 4} 
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Lastly, turning to the question of the appropriate exchange rate regime for Turkey we 
note that majority of countries in the world are moving towards fixed or freely floating 
exchange rates. As noted by Buiter and Grafe (2002) there are only two exchange rate 
regimes that are sustainable in the long run. These are the free floating exchange rate 
and a symmetric monetary union, which is defined to be a monetary union with a 
monetary authority satisfying the following conditions: (i) its mandate spans the entire 
monetary union, (ii) it acts as lender of last resort on the same terms in every union 
member state, (iii) seigniorage is shared fairly among all union member states, and 
(iv) it is accountable to the legitimate political representatives of the citizens of the 
whole union.
16 To join a monetary union with fixed exchange rate the country has to 
resolve its fiscal problems, attain price stability, achieve a sound banking sector, and 
its current account is sustainable. Until these conditions are satisfied Turkey should 
avoid  adopting a fixed or semi-fixed e xchange rate regime, and  thus  should not 
consider any regime other than the flexible exchange rate regime. Currency board 
arrangements and euroization should not be the alternatives for Turkey.
17  Thus, a 
viable exchange rate regime for Turkey in the near future seems to be the dirty float.  
Here one should note that the equilibrium level of the RER needs to be achieved 
gradually over time. Sharp depreciation of the RER  should be avoided as domestic 
firms in Turkey as of the beginning of 2004 have accumulated large foreign exchange 
liabilities. Under these circumstances, a sharp devaluation would provoke massive 




                                                            
16 Here we note that European Monetary Union (EMU) is such a symmetric monetary union which has strict 
conditions on fiscal policy. The budgetary decisions by member countries are subject to surveillance by the 
Union as a whole in the context of the requirements set out in the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
17 During the period prior to the collapse of its currency regime in 2001 Turkey did have a regime very 
close to the currency board. The system failed as Turkey did have neither a sound  fiscal framework nor a 
sound banking sector and had not attained price stability. Furthermore, it did not have a graceful exit 
strategy.  
18 We should note that sharp depreciations can not be prevented by central banks if they find themselves 
playing against rest of the market participants. Therefore, in order to smoothen the reactions of the market 
participants, measures should be taken to  affect the expectations of market participants in the desired 
direction.  
We note that a sharp depreciation in RER may occur also due to changes in the sentiment in the foreign 
exchange market, especially when the market is “thin” and “shallow”. In shallow foreign exchange markets, 
instinctive reactions of few market participants to an event may lead to sharp changes in the nominal 
exchange rate, as  was witnessed during the crisis episodes in Turkey. When the nominal exchange rate 
exhibits such a sharp movement, the uncertainty it creates leads the market participants either to shy away 
from engaging in any foreign exchange contracts leading to an even thinner foreign exchange market or to 
position themselves at the “excess side” of the market, thereby aggravating the movement in the nominal 
exchange rate  in  a  shallower f oreign exchange market. If this episode continues sufficiently long the 
nominal exchange rate becomes sticky at its new level and, therefore, the damaging effects of the sharp 
changing RER on the economy will be materialized. In order to avoid such an outcome, under such 
circumstances the central bank can, and should, act as a market maker, in the foreign exchange market. 
Central bank should have the skill a nd credibility to convince the market participants concerning its 
intention behind such an intervention. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
During the last two and half decades Turkey has suffered from three foreign exchange 
crisis resulting in considerable loss of income and in the creation of substantial social 
and political stresses within the country. The paper argues that the country in order to 
avoid the occurance of foreign exchange crisis has to ensure that over time the sum of 
NICA to GDP and FDI to GDP ratios be at least be as large as the sustainable value of 
the sum of NICA to GDP and FDI to GDP ratios. In order to attain sustainability in its 
current account the country should  pursue policies that will improve the business 
climate in the country so that FDI inflows into the country will increase over time and 
also keep the RER close to its long run equilibrium level.  
 
Under perfect capital mobility there will always be the unavoidable risk of speculative 
attacks on the currency unless the country resolves its fiscal problems, attains price 
stability, and achieves a sound banking sector. A further requirement for avoiding the 
occurance of currency crises is the condition that the RER should not deviate 
considerably from its long run equilibrium value.   
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Figure 3: Annual Inflation and Annual Rate of Exchange Rate Depreciation 
 
 









































































































Note: The dark line shows the annual rate of inflation and the pink line the rate of 
depreciation of the TL/$ exchange rate. 
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Table 1: Exchange Rate Regimes of Turkey
Volatility of Volatility of
IMF IMF Classification Exchange  Exchange
Old New of Babula Rates Rate Volatility of
Classification (1) Classification (2) and Otker (3) Annual Changes Reserves
1980 (ii) 9.167 18.019 1.972
1981 (ii) 3.254 2.237 3.131
1982 (iii) 2.995 1.865 2.446
1983 (iii) 3.245 1.379 1.801
1984 (iii) 3.950 2.547 2.543
1985 (iii) 2.360 1.769 1.550
1986 (iii) 2.472 2.261 2.583
1987 (iii) 2.391 1.154 1.825
1988 (iii) 5.080 2.108 2.832
1989 (iii) 2.149 1.186 4.079
1990 (iii) 9 1.834 0.978 2.816
1991 (iii) 9 4.854 2.929 4.688
1992 (iii) 9 4.296 2.142 4.776
1993 (iii) 9 4.433 1.579 3.553
1994 (iii) 7 10.770 15.141 8.115
1995 (iii) 9 3.579 2.515 14.266
1996 (iii) 9 5.222 1.245 8.618
1997 (iii) 9 5.538 0.944 8.913
1998 (iii) 7 3.659 1.812 12.500
1999 IV 7 4.618 1.373 5.658
2000 IV 7 2.323 1.102 8.480
2001 VIII 13 9.773 8.080 13.553
2002 VIII 3.247 3.310 7.190
2003 3.132 2.007 9.554
4.347 3.320 5.727
Notes:
1. The three regimes are: (i) pegged regimes, (ii) regimes with limited flexibility, and (iii) more flexible 
     arrangements
2. The eight regimes are: (I) dollarization and euroization, (II) currency board, (III) conventional fixed pegs, 
     (IV) horizontal bands, (IV) crawling pegs, (VI) crawling bands, (VII) managed floats with no preannounced
     path for the exchange rate, and (VIII) independent float
3. The thirteen regimes are: (1) formal dollarization and euroization, (2) currency union, (3) currency board
     arrangements, (4) conventional fixed pegs vis-a-vis single currency, (5) conventioanl fixed pegs vis-a-vis 
     a basket of currencies, (6) horizontal bands, (7) forward  looking crawling pegs, (8) backward looking 
     crawling pegs, (9) forward  looking crawling bands, (10) backward looking crawling bands,  (11) tightly 
     managed floats, (12) other managed floats with no predetermined exchange rate path, and 






Table 2: Results for the Quarterly Instrumental Variable Regression of NICA/GDP
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
C -2.56863 -1.41186
d log (Agg. Dom. Demand in Home Country) -29.89038 -12.12362
d log (Agg. Dom. Demand in Foreign Country) 38.84045 1.95129







Durbin-Watson stat* 2.14602  23
 
 
Table 3: Current Account Sustainability
10 years 20 years 25 years
1984 0.730 0.546 0.476
1985 0.858 0.761 0.724
1986 0.801 0.664 0.613
1987 0.952 0.919 0.907
1988 1.564 1.950 2.095
1989 1.434 1.732 1.844
1990 0.753 0.584 0.521
1991 1.258 1.435 1.501
1992 1.016 1.027 1.031
1993 0.310 -0.163 -0.341
1994 1.409 1.690 1.795
1995 0.755 0.587 0.524
1996 0.726 0.537 0.467
1997 0.755 0.587 0.524
1998 1.135 1.228 1.262
1999 0.864 0.770 0.735
2000 0.258 -0.251 -0.441
2001 1.433 1.730 1.842
2002 0.865 0.772 0.737
2003 0.542 0.228 0.110





Table 4: Sustainable Combinations of FDI/GDP, NICA/GDP and RER
Required Required Rate of
FDI/GDP Change in Depreciation of 
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